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Counting Every Thought: Indirect Measures of Cognitive Responses to Advertising
ABSTRACT
Prior methods of assessing consumers’ cognitive responses to advertisements have
focused on thought-listing techniques, and valence-weighted sums thought counts are often
reliable indicators of attitudes towards products and brands. Our research explores new implicit
measures of cognitive responses that focus on detecting the effects of specific thoughts. In four
experiments, we demonstrate that consumers’ thoughts about persuasive messages can be
assessed by both an explicit memory task that involves recognition of a thought that might have
occurred during an ad exposure and an implicit memory task that involves verification of a
current belief and makes no reference to the previous ad exposure. Both tasks provide a way to
detect the occurrence of a specific thought through its effects on memory processes. We also
show that performance on these tasks (i.e., jointly observed responses, reaction times, and
confidence ratings) can be modeled as Poisson counting processes and estimated model
parameters are conceptually and statistically superior to any one of the three performance
measures considered in isolation. Finally, our third and fourth experiments replicate these results
and illustrate the effectiveness of these new implicit measures in predicting consumers’ product
attitudes.
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Persuasive communication, as a component of advertising effectiveness, has been an
ongoing topic of consumer research for over 40 years (dating back to at least Krugman 1965).
Most theories posit that the thoughts elicited by persuasive messages, which are typically called
cognitive responses, are important determinants of attitude change (e.g., Chattopadhyay and Alba
1988; Greenwald 1968; Petty and Cacioppo 1986; Shavitt and Brock 1986). In broad stroke,
these theories maintain that as people process the information in advertisements, they react to it
mentally and the valence (positive, negative, or neutral) of these cognitive responses contribute
directly to attitude change. Developing valid measures of cognitive responses is important both
to test these theories and to predict attitude change.
The traditional method of measuring cognitive responses to an advertisement is the
thought-listing technique (e.g., Cacioppo and Petty 1981; Ericcson and Simon 1980; Wright
1973) in which an individual is asked to list everything coming to his or her mind during ad
exposure. These thoughts are either listed concurrently as people view the ad (e.g., Brinol, Petty,
and Tormala 2004; Shavitt and Brock 1986) or recalled retrospectively after some delay (e.g.,
Chattopadhyay and Alba 1988). Specific responses have not been used to predict attitudes.
Rather, the cognitive responses are usually coded for valence and summed or averaged to form
measure of net affective response. This measure is a reliable predictor of attitude (e.g., Petty and
Cacioppo 1979; Wright 1973). Recently, the confidence expressed by people in the validity of
their cognitive responses has been shown to also be a reliable predictor of attitude (Brinol, Petty,
and Tormala 2004; Petty, Brinol, and Tormala 2002).
In this paper, we investigate the key assumptions (1) that specific cognitive responses
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occur during the processing of persuasive messages and (2) that each such response exerts some
effect on subsequent attitudes. Despite their success in predicting attitudes, thought-listing
techniques are necessarily introspective. As such, they are suspect because retrospective
methods rely on memory processes that are potentially errorful and biased, and concurrent
methods have potential problems of reactivity that could distort the measurement of cognitive
responses and the processing of ad information itself. In the extreme, cognitive responses might
not occur at all, but thought-listing might be correlated with some other process that contributes
to attitude formation and change (e.g., Nisbett and Wilson 1977). For example, thought-listing
relies on intentional retrieval to report internal cognitive processing, and this intentional retrieval
has the potential to introduce bias either through an unwillingness (e.g., when thoughts are
socially inappropriate) or an inability (e.g., forgetting) to report thoughts that did occur or
through introducing new thoughts that were not present during ad exposure (Cacioppo, von
Hippel, and Ernst 1997). To address these concerns, we desire methods that have a clear causal
relationship to the occurrence of specific cognitive responses and are less susceptible to the
contaminating biases of introspection.
The first method we consider is thought recognition (which is described by Cacioppo et
al. 1997, but we cannot find any published research using the method). In this paradigm (as we
implement it), a common sentence frame is used. An example is “When viewing advertisements,
people often have a variety of thoughts and reactions. Regardless of what you believe now, when
viewing the magazine ads earlier in this experiment, did you ever think to yourself, ‘The Fiat
SUV is fast’?” The final sentence varies across trials and the underlined word occurs after a
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delay long enough to assure comprehension of the sentence frame and brand before the target
attribute is presented. The target attribute is suggested or implied by the target ad but is not
explicitly mentioned in the ad. Subjects respond “Yes” or “No” and then provide a confidence
rating for their response. This paradigm is a variation of the classic sentence verification task
(e.g., Rosch et al. 1976; Smith, Shoben, and Rips 1974). Thought recognition differs from
sentence verification mainly in being an episodic rather than a semantic memory task and in
having no objectively correct response.
Thought recognition requires some introspection because the respondent is asked to
examine a verbal representation of a cognitive response and affirm or deny that it occurred
during ad exposure. Nonetheless, this measure offers several potential advantages over thought
listing. First, recognition is generally a more sensitive measure than recall (e.g., Gardiner 1988;
Johnston, Dark, and Jacoby, 1985). Second, the required information retrieval processes for
recognition are simpler and less susceptible to constructive biases than recall (e.g., Alba and
Hasher 1983; Novemsky and Ratner 2003). Finally, reaction times and confidence ratings for
recognition tasks have been extensively studied for external stimuli, such as lists of words,
pictures, and sentences (e.g., Berger and Mitchell 1989; Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz,
1998; Van Zandt and Maldonado-Molina, 2004). In theory, the recognition of internal, mental
events should yield similar results. Reaction times have the added benefit of being unobtrusive
(subjects need not know that time is being measured) and resistant to conscious control and the
biases created by such control (e.g., Fazio, Powell, and Williams 1989; Fazio et al. 1986;
Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz, 1998). Thus, we consider reaction time to be implicit, but
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consider the response itself, valence, and subsequent confidence rating to be explicit because of
their direct reference to the occurrence of a specific cognitive response. Our reasons for this
usage are similar to those of Fazio and Olson (2003) and Whittlesea and Wright (1997) regarding
implicit memory and attitude measures. We mean the term implicit to cover measures that are
either unavailable to awareness or not easily controlled consciously. We do not mean to imply
there are separate memory or evaluation systems.
The second paradigm we consider is belief verification. As for thought recognition, a
common sentence frame is used. An example is “The Fiat SUV is fast.” The underlined word
occurs after a delay long enough to assure comprehension of the sentence frame and brand
before the target attribute is presented. Subjects respond “Agree” or “Disagree.” This too is a
variation of the classic sentence verification task, differing only in that there is no objectively
correct response. Belief verification should be even less susceptible to contamination than
thought recognition because the task makes no reference to the advertisement. Thus, all
measures derived from this task are implicit.
To summarize, there are three measurement paradigms that are potentially appropriate for
detecting the occurrence of cognitive responses: thought listing, thought recognition, and belief
verification. From each of these tasks, four specific measures are possible: the response itself,
the valence of that response, the confidence expressed in the validity of that response, and the
reaction time taken to respond. Table 1 summarizes the current literatures in consumer research
and psychology on these methods and measures. Our goal is to empirically assess the value of
thought recognition and belief verification as measures of cognitive responses to advertising.
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----------------------------------------------Insert Table 1 and Figure 1 about here
----------------------------------------------EXPERIMENTAL HYPOTHESES
All of the experiments reported here manipulate the likelihood that an advertisement will
produce a specific cognitive response. In particular, pre-tests identified four magazine
advertisements that yielded a common response for all or almost all subjects in a retrospective
thought listing task (i.e., high thought likelihood ads, which we also call target ads). Control ads
(i.e., low thought likelihood ads) were constructed by removing all verbal and visual cues that
suggested the target attribute. These eight ads are shown in Figure 1.
From the literatures on cognitive responses, memory, and confidence discussed thus far,
we conclude that the thoughts that people have when reacting to advertisements should leave a
measurable memory trace. Moreover, the tasks that should reveal that memory trace include
thought recognition and belief verification for sentences that express those thoughts. In these
tasks, the memory trace should reveal itself in a variety of ways, and these expected effects of
memory traces form the basis of our experimental hypotheses.
First, target ads should yield more positive responses than control ads (H1, see Exhibit 1).
This is essentially a manipulation check. However, this hypothesis can fail even though thought
likelihood has been successfully manipulated because there are floor or ceiling effects, because
there are normative or self-expressive reasons to give positive or negative responses, or because
the memory system in which the trace exists is not available to conscious awareness.

Measuring Cognitive Responses 9

--------------------------------Insert Exhibit 1 about here
--------------------------------Second, target ads should yield faster positive responses than control ads (H2, see Exhibit
1). For both tasks, the cognitive response is a form of elaboration that should enhance the
accessibility of the information required to make a positive response. The mechanism is similar
to that postulated for many standard priming and sentence verification tasks (e.g., Burroughs and
Feinberg 1987; Shrum, Wyer, and O'Guinn' 1998; Williams, Fitzsimons, and Block, 2004) as
well as for attitude judgments (e.g., Berger and Mitchell 1989; Fazio, Powell, and Williams 1989;
Fazio, et al. 1986). We note, however, that the logic behind this hypothesis for positive
responses offers little that helps predict latencies for negative responses. This is because the
evidence used for negative responses in these tasks is neither obvious based on common sense
nor well-known in the related literatures. For example, it might be that the cognitive response, in
addition to increasing the accessibility of positive evidence, also decreases the accessibility of
negative evidence and negative responses should be slowed. However, it could also be that
negative responses are given only when an insufficient amount of positive evidence has been
retrieved from memory after some internal “deadline.” In this case, there would be no difference
in reaction times between target and control ads. In fact, because we construct control ads by
removing certain components of target ads, it could be that our target ads create more overall
elaboration and therefore reduced latencies for both positive and negative responses. We will
return to this issue we describe a specific model of decision making for these tasks, but at this
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point we are agnostic about negative responses.
Finally, target ads should yield higher confidence ratings for positive responses than
control ads (H3, see Exhibit 1). Confidence should increase because more positive evidence is
retrieved from memory. Also, the rapid response itself may be interpreted as increased certainty
and slow responses as uncertainty in much the same way that feelings of knowledge and feelings
of learning increase confidence (e.g., Hawkins and Hoch 1992; Sanbonmatsu, Kardes, and
Sansone 1991). As for reaction times, it is not clear what should be predicted for negative
responses.
A PROCESS MODEL OF RESPONSE, REACTION TIME, AND CONFIDENCE
Our hypotheses involve three related dependent measures and draw upon theory from
several substantive domains. However, the interrelationships among the three measures are not
clear and, as noted, it is difficult to make clear predictions for negative responses. Fortunately,
detailed statistical models for choice, reaction time, and confidence have been developed for
simple perceptual judgments and for memory tasks. One of these, the Poisson counting model,
has emerged as particularly useful for unifying the three dependent measures.1 Thus, we will use
this model to estimate a single latent measure of memory trace strength from joint observations
of the three objectively measured variables.

1

There are extensive literatures on models that jointly account for choices and reaction times (e.g., Townsend and Ashby 1983)
and for choices and confidence ratings (e.g., Smith and Vickers 1988); however, joint models of all three variables are relatively
few and relatively recent (e.g., Van Zandt 2000; Van Zandt and Maldonado-Molina 2004). The Poisson model is useful mainly
because of it’s mathematical tractability, intuitive mapping into the three variables, and empirical success in accounting for
experimental results. However, this is not to say it is universally accepted as the best model and has some clear inadequacies for
certain experimental paradigms and certain aspects of reaction data (e.g., see Ratliff and Smith 2005). Nevertheless, it, and the
conceptually similar accumulator model of Vickers, have been particularly successful in relating confidence to choice and
reaction time and have avoided critical problems that have emerged for random walk models (see van Zandt 2000).
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Counting models of choice assume that memory processes generate evidence (of which
people may or may not be consciously aware) in favor of each of the choice alternatives. For
thought recognition and belief verification tasks, the choice alternatives are positive or negative
responses. Each accumulation process simply counts the number of evidence events that favor
its response. There is a criterion level of evidence for each counter and whichever counter
reaches its criterion first determines the response. Essentially, the process is race.
-------------------------------Insert Figure 2 about here
-------------------------------The details of the counting model are illustrated in Figure 2 (and developed
mathematically in Appendix A). In this example, the criterion for a positive response, Kp, is 5,
and the criterion for a negative response, Kn, is 6. Evidence is assumed to be discrete with
interarrival times that are independently and exponentially distributed. Thus, each counter is a
Poisson process. The rate of evidence accumulation is vp for the positive counter and vn for the
negative counter. The decision process superimposes the two counting processes. In the
example, the positive counter reached 5 at t = 2.7, at which time the negative counter was at 4.
As a result, the response was positive and the reaction time was 2.7. Confidence is naturally
represented by the “balance of evidence” at the time of the response (e.g., Smith and Vickers
1988). In this case, there were 5 evidence events in favor of a positive response and 4 in favor of
a negative response. Thus, we expect confidence to be higher than when negative evidence is at
5, but lower than when it is at 3, 2, 1, or 0 (and negative evidence cannot be 6 or more for a
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positive response). That is, confidence is assumed to be inversely related to the amount of
evidence supporting the opposite response. Note that, for a given response, evidence in favor of
that response will be constant by definition (i.e., Kp or Kn) and can have no effect on confidence.
To account for the data in our experiments we assume that, for a given product, (1) the
criteria (i.e., Kp and Kn) are the same for both target and control ads and (2) the rates at which
evidence accrues (i.e., vpT, vnT, vpC, and vnC) depend on both the type of evidence and the type
of ad. These model parameters (with a few technical assumptions, see Appendix A) jointly
predict the likelihood of any multivariate observation of response, reaction time, and confidence
rating. Thus, standard maximum likelihood methods can be used to estimate the parameters and
test hypotheses about them.
Conceptually, our earlier qualitative predictions all derived from the central hypothesis
that cognitive responses leave a memory trace that affects all three measures (plus the
assumption that cognitive responses are more likely for target ads than control ads). The effects
of these memory traces are represented in the positive rate parameters of the counting model.
Thus, vpT should be greater than vpC (H4 in Exhibit 1), and this hypothesis is more directly
related to theoretical mechanisms (i.e., memory trace strength) than are hypotheses about the
three observed dependent measures (i.e., H1 - H3). As discussed earlier, predictions about
negative responses are not obvious based on prior research. However, we cannot neglect them.
Of particular concern, if the target ad simply elicits more elaboration than the control ad, then
subsequent processing of all target ad information might be facilitated and H1 - H4 might hold
because of this whether the specific cognitive response that we hypothesize occurred or not.
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Because of the possibility of such a main effect, we hypothesize that any facilitation that occurs
should be greater for positive responses than for negative responses. To be precise, we
hypothesize that vpT - vpC > vnT - vnC (H5 in Exhibit 1). Finally, the Poisson counting model
predicts a negative correlation between reaction time and confidence (see Appendix A). This is
also implied by H2 and H3, and we, in fact, observed a significant negative correlation between
reaction time and confidence in every experiment.
In summary, estimating the counting model allows us to test our central hypothesis more
directly and completely than when each dependent measure is considered in isolation. It also
provides a unifying explanation for our predictions about those measures that allows us to rule
out alternative explanations when those predictions are confirmed by data. Importantly, the
model also provides a potential explanation when the predictions are not confirmed. In particular,
H4 can hold, but H1, H2, or H3 can fail because of the values of vnT and vnC (see Appendix A).
Thus, H4 and H5 are, in theory, better tests of our central hypothesis than are H1 - H3.
Pragmatically, they are somewhat harder to test empirically because they require estimation of a
specialized statistical model. As will become evident, however, this pragmatic cost is not
prohibitive and, for our data at least, the results are more statistically powerful than the results of
testing each dependent measure separately (i.e., testing H1 - H3).
EXPERIMENT 1
Experiment 1 was designed to test H1 - H5 for the thought recognition task.
Method
Materials and design. As discussed earlier, four target ads that were likely to elicit target
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attributes as cognitive responses were selected on the basis of pretest results. These four ads are
shown in Figure 1. A control ad was created for each of these by eliminating factors that could
elicit target thoughts; however, brand names and product pictures were otherwise the same (see
Figure 1).

Each participant was presented with one ad for each product of which two were

target ads and two were control ads. A fractional design was used to create orthogonal within
subject factors for thought likelihood (high/target vs. low/control) and product (SUV, chipnuts,
television, or lotion), plus a between subjects factor that counterbalanced stimulus order (i.e., a
random order and its reversal). As noted, products were nested within price vs. non-price
attributes; however, this factor is not of theoretical interest and did not produce significant effects,
so it is not discussed further. This design required eight separate groups, and subjects were
randomly assigned to groups.
Participants and Procedure. The participants were 150 undergraduates from an East
Coast university who participated in fulfillment of a course requirement.
All materials and instructions were presented on a computer located in individual
cubicles. First, demographic information was collected. Participants were then told that we were
conducting marketing research concerning the effects of advertising and that they would be
presented with four advertisements one by one. They were asked to view these advertisements as
if they were reading a magazine and thinking that they might purchase these products. Four ads
were then presented sequentially at a rate of 20 seconds per ad.
After the ad presentations, participants were given instructions about the thought
recognition task. They then responded to eight specific questions: four practice questions,
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followed by four experimental questions. Before each question, a dialog box appeared reminding
participants to put their left index finger on the “No” key and their right index finger on the
“Yes” key. They then pressed the space bar with either their right or left thumb to make a
question appear. A laminated paperboard covered the keyboard except for the keys to be used in
the task, which were labeled according to their response meaning. After pressing the space bar,
they would first see a question with the last word missing (e.g., the first practice question was
“When you entered the behavioral lab, was the experimenter ___?”), and they were instructed to
read this question and wait for the last word to appear. There was a 10 second interval before the
last word appeared (which was “seated” in this example). After the final word appeared, they
either pressed the “No” or the “Yes” key. Following this response, a question mark appeared in
the center of the screen, prompting participants to enter a confidence rating. If they responded
“Yes” to the question, then they were prompted to press one of three keys labeled “Certain Yes,”
“Probably Yes” or “Maybe Yes” with their right index finger on the computer keyboard. If they
responded “No” to the question, then they were prompted to press one of three keys labeled
“Certain No,” “Probably No” or “Maybe No” with their left index finger. This method is similar
to that of Van Zandt and Maldonado-Molina (2004). Participants were instructed to answer each
question as quickly as they could while making as few mistakes as possible, but they were not
explicitly told that their responses were being timed.
Practice questions asked some general questions about the experimenter or the lab. The
first three were irrelevant to the experimental task. However, the format of the final practice
question was similar to the experimental questions: “When viewing advertisements, people often
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have a variety of thoughts and reactions. Regardless of what you believe now, when viewing
television commercials, do you ever think to yourself, ‘That product is cool’?” An example of an
experimental question is, “When viewing advertisements, people often have a variety of thoughts
and reactions. Regardless of what you believe now, when viewing the magazine ads earlier in
this experiment, did you ever think to yourself, ‘The Fiat SUV is fast’?” Again, it is important to
note that the target words (i.e., “fast,” “spicy,” “expensive,” and “cheap”) were not explicitly
present in the ads. Participants made thought recognition judgments for all four products in a
sequence consistent with the initial ad presentation order.
Dependent Measures
Response. The frequencies for each type of each type of thought recognition response
(i.e., Yes or No) were explicit measures of the occurrence of the target cognitive response and, as
such, acted as a manipulation check for thought likelihood.
Reaction Time (RT). RT was defined as the time between the appearance of the target
word and the recognition judgment (i.e., when participants pressed the “Yes” or “No” key) and
provided an imlicit measure of the occurrence of the target cognitive response.
Confidence Rating. After choosing either the positive or the negative response for each
question, participants indicated their confidence using the three-point scale described earlier.
This provided a second explicit measure of the occurrence of the target cognitive response.
Results
Response. Response frequencies are reported in Table 2. This binary variable was
submitted to a logistic regression with thought likelihood (high/target vs. low/control) as the
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predictor. Consistent with H1, more positive responses were observed for target ads (73%) than
for control ads (45%). The effect of thought likelihood on response was statistically significant
(χ2(1) = 44.10, p < .0001). H1 was also supported when each product was analyzed separately
(χ2(1) = 18.41, p < .0001, for lotion, χ2(1) = 27.47, p < .0001, for SUV, χ2(1) = 4.36, p = .03,
for TV, and χ2(1) = 3.05, p = .08, for chipnuts).
------------------------------------------Insert Table 2 Here
------------------------------------------Reaction Time. Least-square mean RTs are reported in Table 2.2 Prior to statistical
analyses, we examined the distributions of RTs and located small proportions of extremely fast
and extremely slow responses. Given that these outliers are most likely due to factors not of
theoretical interest, we excluded observations below 250 ms and above 7500 ms (38 out of 1200
RTs; see Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz 1998).
H2 and H3 pertain only to positive responses, so negative responses must be treated as
missing. This precludes using traditional repeated measures ANOVA because of its reliance on
the method of moments. Maximum likelihood methods, however, do not exhibit this missing
data problem (for discussions of this issue see McCulloch 2005 and Wolfinger and Chang 1998).
PROC MIXED in the SAS suite of statistical software was used. This method explicitly models
the error covariance structure among repeated measures and, therefore, requires a choice among

2

Throughout we report least-square means because analyzing only positive responses introduces non-orthogonalities in cell sizes
and because we include Base RT as a covariate in most analyses. The qualitative pattern of the results is the same when sample
means are computed.
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possible structures (i.e., compound symmetry, Huynh-Feldt, and unstructured). As recommended
by Wolfinger and Chang (1998), all three models were estimated and compared. A more
complex model was used only if both a significant likelihood ratio test and a lower AIC value
were obtained. Because of the fractional factorial design a fully crossed model is not estimable
(by any method). Therefore, the estimated model included main effects of thought likelihood,
product, and position, plus the interactions of thought likelihood with product and with position.
The model exhausts the available degrees of freedom from experimental conditions and provides
appropriate tests of H2 and its possible moderation by product or position. An individual level
variable, Base RT, was computed as the average RT for the four practice questions and was
included in the model as a covariate to account for individual differences in overall speed.
The model was estimated using the three error structures and criteria discussed earlier,
and the unstructured model was chosen as most appropriate for these data. The statistically
significant effects were thought likelihood, F(1,144) = 9.5, p = .0025, product, F(3,144) = 10.9, p
< .0001, and position, F(3,144) = 4.2, p = .007. Base RT was also significant, F(1,144) = 80.8, p
< .0001. The interaction of thought likelihood with product approached significance, F(3,144) =
2.3, p = .08, reflecting variation in the size, but not the direction, of the effect of thought
likelihood. The effect size ranged from 27 msec for chipnuts ads to 790 msec for SUV ads with
an overall average of 398 msec (see Table 2). Overall, H2 was supported.
For completeness, the RTs for negative responses were analyzed using the models,
methods, and criteria discussed earlier. The compound symmetry model was chosen as most
appropriate for these data. Only Base RT was statistically significant, F(1,135) = 57, p < .0001.
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Confidence Ratings. Least-square mean confidence ratings are reported in Table 2. The
same model, methods, and selection criteria as were used for RTs were used to analyze
confidence ratings. The compound symmetry model was chosen as most appropriate for these
data. The statistically significant effects were thought likelihood, F(1,90) = 17.2, p < .0001, and
product, F(3,187) = 12.7, p < .0001. The interaction of thought likelihood with product
approached significance, F(3,187) = 2.5, p = .06, reflecting variation in the size, but not the
direction, of the effect of thought likelihood. Overall, H3 was supported.
For completeness, confidence ratings for negative responses were also analyzed using the
models, methods, and criteria discussed earlier, and the compound symmetry model was chosen
as most appropriate for these data. No effects were statistically significant.
Counting model. The counting model introduced earlier was estimated separately for
each product (i.e., target/control pairs of ads) by maximizing the likelihoods of the jointly
observed responses, RTs, and confidence ratings. Because of the strong effects of Base RT, RTs
were normalized by regressing raw RTs onto Base RT and then adding a constant to the residuals
to insure positivity. This normalization removed variance due to heterogeneity, which was not
explicitly modeled in the analysis. The estimation method is described in Appendix A.
------------------------------------------Insert Table 3 here
------------------------------------------Table 3 reports estimated model parameters, goodness-of-fit indices, and statistical tests
for H4 and H5. Goodness-of-fit was fairly high for all products with the possible exception of
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lotion. As discussed earlier, our central hypothesis is that cognitive responses leave a memory
trace that affects all three dependent measures. Given the assumption that cognitive responses
are more likely for target ads than control ads, this implies that vpT should be greater than vpC
(H4 in Exhibit 1). Table 3 reports D1 = vpT - vpC, and t1 provides a statistical test of D1 > 0.
The value of t1 was at least 2 (i.e., p < .05) for all four products, supporting H4. Table 3 also
reports D2 = vnT - vnC, and the values of t2 are less than -2 for all four products which, when
combined with the results for positive responses, strongly supports H5. Although we did not
predict this a priori, the fact that vnT is less than vnC suggests that the memory trace left by the
cognitive response inhibits negative responses and well as facilitating positive response. The
mechanism of this inhibit might be similar to that for part-list cuing effects in which items
recalled early inhibit the recall of other items (e.g., Alba and Chattopadhyay 1985).
EXPERIMENT 2
The pattern of results observed in Experiment 1 was supportive of all of our hypotheses
regarding thought recognition as a measure of cognitive response (i.e., H1 - H5). Compared to
control ads, target ads yielded more positive responses that were given more quickly and with
greater confidence. In a thought recognition task, only RT is an implicit measure. The response
and rated confidence in the response are potentially susceptible to contamination because they
explicitly refer to the possible occurrence of the cognitive response. Thus, it is theoretically and
pragmatically important to develop a more completely implicit measure of cognitive responses.
Experiment 2 was conducted to examine one such method using the belief verification task.
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Method
All experimental materials, design, and procedure were identical to that used in
experiment 1, except that participants were required to perform a series of belief verification
tasks rather than thought recognition tasks after seeing four ads.
Participants. One hundred and fifty-one students from an East Coast university received
$10 monetary compensation for participating in the experiment.
Dependent Measures
The dependent measures were the same as those of experiment 1 (i.e., response frequency,
RT, and confidence), except the task was belief verification. All three measures can be regarded
as implicit insofar as the task does not explicitly refer to the prior advertisements.
Results
Response. Response frequencies are reported in Table 2. This binary variable was
submitted to a logistic regression with thought likelihood (High/target vs. Low/control) as the
predictor. Consistent with H1, more positive responses were observed for target ads (88%) than
for control ads (75%). The effect of thought likelihood on response was statistically significant
(χ2(1) = 16.0, p < .0001). When this analysis was conducted separately for each product, all were
directionally consistent with H1 and two were statically significant (χ2(1) = 3.95, p = .04, for
lotion, and χ2(1) = 19.66, p < .0001, for SUV, χ2(1) = 1.87 for TV, and χ2(1) = 1.05 for
chipnuts). Overall, H1 was supported; however, positive responses were more likely in general
for belief verification than for thought recognition, and there appears to have been a ceiling
effect for the TV and chipnuts ads.
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Reaction Time. Mean RTs are reported in Table 2 and Figure 2. As for experiment 1,
RTs below 250 ms and above 7500 ms were excluded from analysis (33 out of 1208 RTs). RTs
for positive responses were analyzed using the models, methods, and criteria described earlier,
and compound symmetry was chosen as most appropriate for these data. The statistically
significant effects were thought likelihood, F(1,132) = 30.6, p < .0001, product, F(3,322) = 13.0,
p < .0001, and position, F(3,322) = 5.1, p = .002. Base RT was also significant, F(1,322) = 98.8,
p < .0001. The interaction of thought likelihood with product was also significant, F(3,322) =
2.9, p = .04, reflecting variation in the size, but not the direction, of the effect of thought
likelihood. The effect size ranged from 170 msec for chipnuts ads to 955 msec for SUV ads with
an overall average of 495 msec (see Table 2). Overall, H2 was supported and the effect was
larger and stronger than for thought recognition in experiment 1. We note that the chipnuts ads
and the SUV ads also had the smallest and largest effects (respectively) in experiment 1. This
suggests some stability in the moderating effect of product.
RTs for negative responses were also analyzed using the models, methods, and criteria
described earlier, and compound symmetry was chosen as most appropriate for these data. The
only statistically significant effect was Base RT, F(1,77) = 16.6, p = .0001.
Confidence Ratings. Least-square mean confidence ratings are reported in Table 2.
Ratings for positive responses were analyzed using the models, methods, and criteria described
earlier, and compound symmetry was chosen as most appropriate for these data. The statistically
significant effects were thought likelihood, F(1,132) = 64.7, p < .0001, product, F(3,322) = 20.4,
p < .0001, and position, F(3,322) = 2.8, p < .04. The interaction of thought likelihood with
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product was also significant, F(3,322) = 2.7, p = .04, reflecting variation in the size, but not the
direction, of the effect of thought likelihood. Overall, H3 was supported.
Confidence ratings for negative responses were also analyzed using the models, methods,
and criteria discussed earlier, and compound symmetry was chosen as most appropriate for these
data. The only statistically significant effect was Base RT, F(1,77) = 8.2, p = .005.
Counting model. The counting model was estimated separately for each product using
the same method as in experiment 1. Table 3 reports estimated model parameters, goodness-offit indices, and statistical tests for the best fitting models. Goodness-of-fit was fairly high for all
products with the possible exception of chipnuts. As in experiment 1, the statistical test of H4, t1,
was at least 2 (i.e., p < .05) for all four products. Also, t2 was less than -2 for all products except
TV. This supports H5 and replicates the inhibitory effect of target thoughts on the accumulation
of negative evidence that was observed in experiment 1.
Discussion
The results for belief verification in experiment 2 closely replicated the results for
thought recognition that were observed in experiment 1. Thus, we have shown that people’s
thoughts about an advertisement can be measured implicitly without making reference to a
previous ad exposure. In fact, the effects appear to be stronger for belief verification than for
thought recognition. Given that we have demonstrated the effectiveness of two new techniques
for detecting specific cognitive responses, it is important to examine the ability of these measures
to predict attitudes. Experiment 3 was designed to achieve this purpose.
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EXPERIMENT 3
As discussed in the introduction, our goal is to empirically test two assumptions made by
most current models of persuasion and advertising effectiveness: (1) specific cognitive
responses occur during the processing of persuasive messages, and (2) each such response exerts
some effect on subsequent attitudes. Experiments 1 and 2 have provided strong evidence for the
first assumption by showing that the occurrence of a specific target thought during ad exposure
results in measurable effects on response frequencies, RTs, and confidence ratings for both
thought recognition and belief verification tasks. In experiment 3, we tested the second
assumption by using these measures as predictors of attitude.
Prior research has almost exclusively used thought-listing measures and measures derived
from listed thoughts, such as valence, confidence in thought validity, and classification as an
interpretation, abstraction, or global evaluation (e.g., Brinol, Petty, and Tormala 2004;
Chattopadhyay and Alba 1988; Ericson and Simon 1980; Petty, Brinol, and Tormala 2002; Petty
and Cacioppo 1979; Shavitt and Brock 1986). Perhaps more importantly, only overall indices
computed by aggregating the derived measures over thoughts for each subject have been used as
predictors of attitude. These aggregate indices have the advantage of accommodating
heterogeneity across individuals in the specific content of cognitive responses. However, they
strip each thought of it’s unique content. This increases the plausibility of alternative
explanations of the observed correlation between valenced elaboration (or confidence) and
attitude. For example, some third factor, such as non-conscious reactions to the ad, might jointly
cause both changes in attitude and the recall of attitude consistent thoughts, even though those
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thoughts had no causal impact on attitude. This explanation is possible, but much less plausible,
for specific thoughts that are defined a priori and based on specific content in the ad. More
pragmatically, such content specific measures potentially provide guidance for improving an ad
and are, therefore, potentially useful for copy testing purposes (cf. Wansink et al. 1994).
Prior research and the results of experiments 1 and 2 suggest the following experimental
hypotheses for the effects of measures of specific thoughts when included as independent
variables in regression models of attitude (see Exhibit 1). First, there should be a main effect of
valence on attitude (H6). Second, there should be a main effect of RT on attitude (H7a) that is
moderated by an interaction with valence (H7b). Finally, there should be a main effect of
confidence on attitude (H8a) that is moderated by an interaction with valence (H8b). These
hypotheses are reasonable only when a positive response is given. As for RTs and confidence,
current models of persuasion have little to say about thoughts that do not occur during exposure
to a message. It might be argued that beliefs that are denied should have effects opposite to those
of beliefs that are verified. However, it is difficult to know whether a negative response was due
to a belief in the opposite of the target thought (e.g., “The Fiat SUV is slow.”) or to a high level
of uncertainty about the validity of the claim. Thus, we simply include an omnibus hypothesis
for belief verification, but not for thought recognition, that the effects obtained when the
response is positive should be reversed when the response is negative (H9).
Method
All the materials, design and procedure adopted in the present study were the same as in
experiment 1 and 2 with the following changes. First, participants’ product evaluations were
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collected right after viewing all four ads and prior to the cognitive response tasks. Putting
attitude measures ahead of cognitive response measures makes it less possible that participants’
product evaluations would be contaminated by how they respond in the cognitive response tasks.
Also, the relatively long instructions on how to perform the cognitive response tasks serve as a
good distracter to lessen the possible effect of attitude measures on participants’ performance.
Recall that the cognitive response tasks are designed to measure the changes in memory trace
strength that occur during ad exposure and before product evaluation. The second
methodological change was that several questions were asked at the end of the experiment as a
means to assess the valence of the target product attributes.
Participants. One hundred and forty-four students from an East Coast university received
$10 monetary compensation for participating in the experiment. Participants were randomly
assigned to either the thought recognition task (N=83, referred to as experiment 3a) or the belief
verification task (N=61, referred to as experiment 3b).
Dependent Measures
The dependent measures included those used in experiments 1 and 2 (i.e., response
frequency, RT, and confidence). Additionally, attitudes toward each of the four products were
assessed using four seven-point semantic differential scales with the following end points:
negative-positive, bad-good, favorable-unfavorable, and dislike-like. Valence was measured by a
seven-point Likert scale rating for each target thought using the sentence frame, “Assume that
<target thought> is true, do you think it will increase the attractiveness of this product?” where
the target thoughts were those used in the thought recognition and belief verification tasks.
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Results
The results of experiment 3 replicated those of experiments 1 and 2 (see Table 2). The
data were analyzed as in the earlier experiments. Consistent with H1, the effect of thought
likelihood on response was statistically significant for thought recognition (χ2(1) = 16.2, p
< .0001) and was marginally significant for belief verification (χ2(1) = 2.74, p = .09). For
positive responses in the thought recognition task, the statistically significant effects on reaction
time were thought likelihood, F(1,50) = 3.84, p = .056, product, F(3,95) = 6.57, p = .0004, and
Base RT, F(1,80) = 28.2, p < .0001. The interaction of thought likelihood with position was also
significant, F(3,95) = 2.74, p = .048, reflecting a reversal of the effect of thought likelihood in
one of the four positions. For positive responses in the belief verification task, the statistically
significant effects on reaction time were thought likelihood, F(1,54) = 18.7, p < .0001, and
product, F(3,117) = 5.48, p = .002. Base RT was also significant, F(1,58) = 52.0, p < .0001.
Overall, H2 was supported for both thought recognition and belief verification. We also note that
the effect of thought likelihood was larger and more reliable for belief verification than for
thought recognition, also replicating the results of Experiments 1 and 2. For thought recognition,
the statistically significant effects on confidence ratings were thought likelihood, F(1,50) = 7.82,
p = .007, and product, F(3,95) = 6.48, p = .0005. For belief verification, the statistically
significant effects on confidence ratings were also thought likelihood, F(1,54) = 28.2, p < .0001,
and product, F(3,117) = 12.4, p < .0001. Overall, H3 was supported.
Counting model. The counting model was estimated as before, and the results are given
in Table 3. Goodness-of-fit was fairly high for all products with the possible exception of the
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SUV for thought recognition. H4 was directionally supported in every case, and t1 was greater
than 2 (i.e., p < .05) for the same three out of four products in both data sets. Also, t2 was less
than -2 for all products for thought recognition and for chipnuts and TV for belief verification.
Thus, H5 was supported and replicates the inhibitory effect of target thoughts on the
accumulation of negative evidence that was observed in the earlier experiments.
Attitudes. The four attitude measures demonstrated high internal consistency (Cronbach

α = .97 for thought recognition, and Cronbach α = .96 for belief verification), so they were
averaged to form a composite attitude index.
Our approach to testing hypotheses H6 through H9 was to use a linear regression model
that included main effects for all variables of interest (i.e., product, thought likelihood, response,
valence, RT, and confidence), plus interactions of those variables with valence (because of H7
and H8), with response (because of H6 and H9), and with product (as a test of robustness for all
effects). To simplify interpretation of the results and reduce multicollinearity, valence was a
binary class variable when interacted with other variables (i.e., valence defined to be was
“positive” if the rating was greater than 4 and “negative” if it was 4 or less; this was
approximately a median split of the observed ratings). Observed ratings were used directly for
the main effects of valence and for confidence. To remove individual differences, RTs were
zero-centered for each subject prior to the analysis. As for previous analyses, maximum
likelihood was used to estimate the model, including correlated error due to the repeated
measures design, and the criteria described earlier were used to select the best error structure.
For thought recognition, the analysis showed that valence (and it’s interactions)
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significantly improved the model compared to a base model that only had effects of thought
likelihood, product, and their interaction, χ2(14) = 73.4, p < .0001. However, adding RTs and
confidence (and their interactions) only marginally improved the model, χ2(14) = 23.0, p = .06.
Also, when each effect in the model was tested separately only product, F(3,193) = 4.22, p
= .006, valence, F(1,193) = 4.20, p = .042, valence x product, F(3,193) = 3.07, p = .029, and RT
x product, F(3,193) = 2.68, p = .049, were significant. Moreover, except for valence, the signs of
the coefficients were generally not consistent with our hypotheses. Thus, we conclude that for
thought recognition H6 was supported, but H7 - H9 were not supported.
For belief verification, the analysis showed that valence (and it’s interactions)
significantly improved the model compared to a base model that only had effects of thought
likelihood, product, and their interaction, χ2(14) = 26.4, p = .023. In contrast to thought
recognition, adding RT and confidence (and their interactions) significantly improved the model,
χ2(14) = 33.2, p = .003. Also, adding each factor (and it’s interactions) separately significantly
improved the model (χ2(5) = 14.4, p = .013, for RT and χ2(5) = 19.0, p = .002, for confidence).
When each effect in the model was tested separately the following effects were significant:
product, F(3,134) = 3.42, p = .020, product x response, F(1,134) = 6.18, p = .014, product x
thought likelihood, F(3,193) = 1.34, p = .025, valence, F(1,134) = 8.00, p = .005, RT x response,
F(1,134) = 5.09, p = .026, RT x product, F(3,134) = 3.63, p = .015, and confidence x response x
product, F(1,134) = 10.2, p = .002. These effect tests must be regarded with caution, however,
because the variables and especially their interactions are not uncorrelated. Thus, we consider
the nested model tests to be the most valid and interpretable. Overall, H6 - H9 were supported;
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however, there were some exceptions (see subsequent discussion).
Discussion
Experiment 3 replicated the results of experiments 1 and 2 in all respects, adding support
to the general conclusion that thought recognition and belief verification tasks provide reliable
indicators that a specific thought occurred during the encoding of an advertisement. As in the
earlier experiments, the observed effects were somewhat larger and more reliable for belief
verification than for thought recognition.
We note that attitudes are determined by a wide variety of factors and our subjects are
likely to have had pre-existing attitudes about the product we used. Thus, it would take very
sensitive measures of both attitudes and their potential antecedents to detect differences across
subjects deriving the occurrence of a single thought. From this perspective, the obtained results
are impressive (especially for the belief verification task).
For the thought recognition task, experiment 3 provided support for an effect of valence
on attitude (H6), but not for effects of RT (H7) or confidence (H8). Although the interaction of
valence with response was not significant, the estimated coefficient was +.47 for positive
responses and -.08 for negative responses, which is consistent with H9.
For the belief verification task, the nested model tests, which show effects of both
reaction time and confidence, are consistent with the conclusion that a single thought during
exposure to an ad can cause, or at least indicate, a change in belief strength that in turn changes
attitude. Table 4 presents the estimated coefficients that are pertinent to our experimental
hypotheses. Hypothesis 7a is supported because the coefficient for RT is negative when the
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response and valence are positive. Consistent with Hypothesis 7b, this coefficient reverses sign
when valence is negative, and consistent with H9, it reverses sign when the response is negative.
However, H7 and H9 together predict that when both response and valence are negative there
should be a “double reversal” or cancellation effect, and the sign of the coefficient should match
that of the coefficient for positive response and valence. In contrast, this coefficient is the most
strongly reversed. This suggests reasoning something like, “I don’t like that attribute, and I think
you are lying about it anyway,” an additive rather than a multiplicative effect. Thus, this
outcome is more intriguing than damaging. Also, we note that there are very few observations
where both the response and the valence are negative (16 out of 231). In fact, there were only 31
negative responses, compared to 200 positive responses; thus, our test of H9 has limited
statistical power. Hypothesis 8a is supported by the positive coefficient for confidence when
response and valence are positive; however, H8b is not supported. As for reaction times,
Hypothesis 9 is supported when valence is positive, but not when it is negative.
------------------------------------------Insert Table 4 Here
------------------------------------------Overall, for belief verification our hypotheses were supported most strongly when both
the response and valence were positive. This is the condition in which theory makes the clearest
predictions. It is also the most frequently observed condition and therefore has the greatest
statistical power. As discussed earlier, it is hard to know much about the types of evidence that
lead to a negative response or what effects such evidence would have on attitude. For example, a
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person might have disagreed with the statement that the Fiat SUV was fast because they believed
it was big and heavy. However, some people might feel that size increases safety and have a
positive attitude toward the car. Other might feel that size decreases fuel efficiency and have a
negative attitude. Thus, the nature of the negative evidence is unknown to us and has ambiguous
effects. In experiment 4, we track multiple, specific thoughts that occur during ad exposure so
that these indeterminacies can be resolved.
EXPERIMENT 4
Experiment 3 examined the effects of a single cognitive response on brand attitude. The
results confirmed our hypotheses when responses and valences were positive, but the results
were mixed when valence was negative and especially when the response was negative.
However, these conditions were infrequently observed and lacked statistical power. We also
noted that attitudes are determined by a wide variety of factors, and our subjects were likely to
have had pre-existing attitudes about the advertised products. Thus, the effects of a single
thought are likely to be small compared to combined effects of these factors, and it is impressive
that such small effects were detected at all for belief verification.
In experiment 4, we examine the properties of response, valence, reaction time, and
confidence ratings in the more complete context of a battery of statements about products that
are likely to cover many, arguably most, of the types of thoughts consumer might have in
response to an advertisement. This approach redresses important limitations of the single
thought paradigm used in the first three experiments. However, there is an important conceptual
difference between the single thought paradigm and the battery of statements paradigm. The
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former is designed to detect the occurrence of a thought as a reaction to a specific persuasive
communication. The latter is designed to detect differences in beliefs about a product, regardless
of the source of those differences. To test the usefulness of the battery of statements paradigm
we derive valence weighted indices from responses, reaction times, and confidence rating and
use them to model attitudes, as is commonly done for other measures of beliefs and cognitive
responses (e.g., Fishbein and Ajzen 1975; Petty and Cacioppo 1986; Toy 1982; Wyer and
Albarracin 2005). Because this approach focuses more generally on beliefs (that include, but are
not limited to, cognitive responses) and because our results have been stronger for belief
verification than for thought recognition, we develop measures using the belief verification task.
Method
The materials, design, procedures, and dependent variables used in experiment 4 were
similar to the belief verification task in Experiment 3 with a few exceptions. First, following
product evaluations, participants performed 48 rather than 4 formal belief verification tasks.
Specifically, in addition to the original target sentence used in the first three experiments, 5 more
attributes for each product were collected from the verbal protocols generated in the pre-test, and
all of these 6 attributes were framed as either negative or positive in valence, resulting in a total
of 12 sentences for each product with 6 positive and the other 6 negative. Furthermore, among all
12 sentences for each product, 8 were the same across all the four products (e.g., <Product
Name> is cool/boring.), and the other 4 were specific to each product (e.g., Fiat Punto SUV is
fast/slow). In order to create short completions for all of these 48 sentences, we also varied the
sentence frames between “is” (e.g., Panasonic HDTV is beautiful.) and “has” (e.g., Panasonic
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HDTV has a clear picture.) with 24 sentences having the “is” frame and 24 having the “has”
frame. Finally, as a between-subject variable, these 48 tasks were presented to participants either
in a product-blocked order (with 12 sentences in each block randomized) or in a random order.
All of the belief verification sentences are provided in Appendix B.
Participants. Two hundred and forty students from an East Coast university received $10
monetary compensation for participating in the experiment.
Results and Discussion
Attitude was the main dependent measure of interest in experiment 4. As in experiment 3,
the four semantic differential ratings were averaged to form a composite index. Blocked vs.
randomized order was an exploratory manipulation and had no statistically significant effects.
Therefore, it is not discussed further.
Independent variables. The valence of each statement was defined a priori (see Appendix
B). Index variables were computed at the individual level for each product. The valence index
was computed as the number of “Agree” responses to positively valenced beliefs minus the
number of “Agree” responses to negatively valenced beliefs . There was no need to compute a
valence index for “Disagree” responses because this index is by definition perfectly, negatively
correlated with the “Agree” index. The RT(Agree) index was computed as the average RT for
“Agree” responses to positively valenced beliefs minus the average RT for “Agree” responses to
negatively valenced beliefs . The RT(Disagree) index, Confidence(Agree) index, and
Confidence(Disagree) index were computed analogously. The RT and Confidence indices
require at least one response in each of the four response categories (i.e., “Agree” for a positive
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belief, “Disagree” for a positive belief, “Agree” for a negative belief, and “Disagree” for a
negative belief) because the average is undefined otherwise. Thus, all data analyses were
performed on the subset of observations that satisfied this condition (i.e., 694 of 963). As for the
previous experiments, only RTs greater than 250 msec and less than 7500 msec were excluded.
To be conservative, if any RT was outside this range, the entire observation was excluded (recall
that each observed attitude rating was associated with 12 RTs, one for each belief). This reduced
the final data set to 574 observations. These indices for RT and confidence are preferred to
indices computed as the sum of values for positive beliefs minus the sum of values for negative
beliefs because the latter approach induces large correlations with the Valence index.
Correlational analyses. All of the belief verification indices were correlated with brand
attitude, as can be seen in Figure 3. The simple correlations with attitude (N = 574) were .67 for
Valence, -.27 for RT(Agree), .25 for RT(Disagree), .25 for Confidence(Agree), and -.36 for
Confidence(Disagree). All correlations were in the expected direction and statistically
significant (p < .0001), supporting H6 - H9. When the positive and negative components of the
RT and Confidence indices were examined separately, each had opposite signs consistent with
H7b and H8b (i.e., -.23 and .06 for RT(Agree), .06 and -.18 for RT(Disagree), .22 and -.06 for
Confidence(Agree), and -.11 and .29 for Confidence(Disagree); p < .01 whenever r > .10).
----------------------------------------------Insert Figure 3 and Table 5 about here
----------------------------------------------Regression analyses. Because up to four repeated measures were available for each
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subject, the same maximum likelihood methods and error covariance structure criteria that were
used in the earlier experiments were used for experiment 4. Compound symmetry was found to
be the best error structure for all analyses. As in experiment 3, a nested models approach was
used. These models were based on three sets of variables: dummy variables for ads, dummy
variables for products, and the belief verification indices described earlier.
Table 5 reports the results of estimating six models. The underlying causal model is that
belief strength affects attitudes as commonly postulated (e.g., Fishbein and Ajzen 1975; Petty
and Cacioppo 1986; Wyer and Albarracin 2005). Differences in belief strength can be due to
both the effects of presented ads and to pre-existing individual differences. The belief
verification indices described earlier measure belief strength at the individual level. The dummy
variables for ads and for products are a natural baseline insofar as they represent a simple model
in which all individuals have the same attitude for a given product (perhaps modified by the ad
viewed prior to making their attitude judgments). The goodness-of-fit measures reported in
Table 5 (i.e., -2LL, AIC, and BIC) indicate that the belief verification indices account for unique
variance in brand attitude. The fact that the estimated coefficients for the ad and product dummy
variables are reduced, but not eliminated by the belief verification indices, suggests that they
capture some, but not all, aspects of attitude. The estimated coefficients for each belief
verification index are quite stable across models. The F statistic is a reasonable indicator of
effect size for fixed effect regressions (Rosenthal and Rosnow 1991), and it suggests that the
valence index is most powerful, followed by Confidence(Agree), RT(Agree),
Confidence(Disagree), and RT(Disagree), in that order.
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Overall, H6, H7, and H8 are strongly supported by the results for Valence, RT(Agree),
and Confidence(Agree). H9 is supported by the results for RT(Disagree) and
Confidence(Disagree), but the implied effects are weak. As discussed earlier, predictions for
Disagree responses are much less clear than for Agree responses.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
From one perspective, the results reported here provide strong validating evidence for the
traditional thought-listing technique for measuring cognitive responses. This is because (1) the
manipulation of thought likelihood was based on pretests that used thought-listing to identify
advertisements for which a specific thought was frequently listed and (2) this manipulation
provided reliable effects for both thought recognition and belief verification. Moreover, the
estimated parameters of the counting model strongly confirmed the effects of thought likelihood.
In addition to confirming that retrospectively listed thoughts occurred as cognitive responses
during ad exposure, traditional valence-weighted aggregate measures of cognitive response were
shown to be predictive of attitudes toward advertised products (experiments 3 and 4).
Our results also highlight several weaknesses of the traditional thought-listing paradigm,
however. First, the implicit measures examined here highlight the known problems of explicit
measures, such as people being unable or unwilling to accurately report their thoughts. Our
stimuli were chosen to maximize the likelihood that people would be both willing and able to
report thoughts. If we had not found strong evidence for the occurrence of the hypothesized
thoughts, it would have been very damaging evidence against the validity of thought-listing.
Therefore, an important problem for future research is to explore conditions under which people
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are most likely to be unwilling or unable to directly report their thoughts and to determine
whether or not the implicit measures developed here are reliable indicators of cognitive
responses when thought-listing fails. Second, our results highlight the fact that traditional
valence-weighted measures of cognitive response predict some, but not all, of the systematic
variation in attitudes across people. The new belief verification indices developed here were
shown to provide significant additional predictive power. Third, results in other areas of attitude
research have shown that imlicit measures are sometimes better than explicit measures in
predicting subsequent spontaneous behavior, even when they uncorrelated with attitudes (e.g.,
Bassili and Brown 2005; Fazio and Olson 2003). Therefore, an important problem for future
research is to identify conditions under which explicit and implicit measures of cognitive
response become dissociated and to develop theories to account for this dissociation. Finally,
despite the success that traditional thought-listing measures have had in academic research, they
have not been widely adopted in commercial advertising research, although parallels between
academic and commercial measures have been noted and academic measures other than
cognitive response indices have been related to in-market effectiveness (e.g., MacInnis, Rao, and
Weiss 2002). One reason for this may be the lack of emphasis on specific cognitive responses in
academic research (see Wansink, Ray, and Batra 1994). To guide the development of more
persuasive advertising and to guide public policy about misleading advertising, measures must
be able to detect the effects of specific ad elements on the cognitive responses, beliefs, attitudes,
and behaviors of consumers. The approach introduced here is a first step in that direction-counting every thought.
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APPENDIX A: POISSON COUNTING MODEL
The development of the Poisson counting presented here closely follows the exposition
and proofs given in Townsend and Ashby (1983, pp. 36-43 and pp. 272-280). Unless otherwise
stated, the results given here follow directly from Townsend and Ashby, or can be derived in a
few algebraic steps.
Three random variables are observed in our data: the response R, which takes specific
values r ∈ {p, n}, the time of the response, T, which takes specific values, t, that are positive real
numbers, and a confidence rating, C, which takes specific values c ∈ {1, 2, 3}. The model
assumes that decisions are based on two independent counters: Xp(t) accumulates positive
evidence events (by summation) and Xn(t) accumulates negative evidence events. Thus, Xp and
Xn are random variables that represent unobserved internal states. Evidence events are
independently and exponentially distributed with rate parameters vp and vn for positive and
negative events, respectively. The rate parameters differ across stimuli (e.g., vpT and vnT for a
target ad and vpC and vnC for a controls ad). The response is determined by the first counter to
reach its criterion (i.e., Kp for a positive response and Kn for a negative response). Considered
separately, each counter is a Poisson process and the time to accumulate any specific number of
evidence events is distributed as gamma. The complete process is a superposition of the two
counting processes and is also a Poisson process (with rate parameter vp + vn).
The “balance of evidence” at t determines the confidence rating. For a positive response,
c = g(Xp(t) - Xn(t)), and for a negative response, c = h(Xn(t) - Xp(t)). For a positive response,
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Xp(t) is Kp by definition, so, for simplicity, g is assumed to be stepwise monotonically increasing,
such that c is the confidence rating whenever c- ≤ Xn(t) ≤ c+. For negative responses, h is a
similar stepwise monotonically increasing function.
Estimation Method
The likelihood for a positive response given at time t with confidence c is
f(R = p, T = t, C = c) = Prob(Positive Evidence = Kp - 1 and T = t)
x Prob(c- ≤ Negative Evidence ≤ c+ and T = t)
x Likelihood(New Positive Evidence in the next instant of time)

=

(vp t)Kp - 1 vp exp(-vp t)
(Kp - 1)!

c+ (v t)j exp(-v t)
n
p

Σ
j=c

-

(j)!

.

(A.1)

A simple approach was used to estimate the model from our data. First, so that a homogeneous
model was plausible, all RTs were regressed onto Base RTs, and the residuals, t′, were treated as
the times to be modeled. The purpose of this transformation was to remove individual
differences in mean RT. Maximum likelihood estimation, based on A.1 and the assumption that
t′, = t0 + t, was implemented using the nlm function of the statistical programming language R.
In particular, for each product, a model was estimated for each pair of criteria (Kp, Kn) for
integer values from 3 to 6 (i.e., 16 models) that maximized the following likelihood function.
L[(r, t′, c); (t0, vpT, vnT, vpC, vnC)] =

Πs

f(rs, ts, cs) .

(A.2)

The t statistics reported in Table 3 were obtained in the conventional manner from the Hessian
matrix that was estimated by the nlm function in R.
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To select among the 16 models, and to provide an easily interpreted index of goodness-of
fit, model parameters were used to compute expected values for each of the 12 possible thought
likelihood/response/confidence triples for a given product using the following formulae (here
given only for positive responses).
P(R = p and C = c) = Ppc
c+

Σ(

)( ) ( )

Kp + j - 1
=
j
j = c-

j

vn

vp + vn

Kp

vp

vp + vn

.

(A.3)

E(T | R = p and C = c)

=

1
Ppc

c+

Σ(

)( ) ( ) ( )

Kp + j - 1
j
j = c-

vn

vp + vn

j

vp

vp + vn

Kp

Kp + j
vp + vn

.

(A.4)

Overall variance-accounted-for (VAF, as reported in Table 3) was simply the R2 obtained when
observed times were regressed on to model-based expected values. The best-fitting model
reported in Table 3 was selected based on overall VAF; however, the qualitative results were
robust with respect to (Kp, Kn). To provide an index of “systematic” VAF, dummy variable
regression was used to compute the best possible R2 for models of this type, and the ratio of
overall R2 to best-possible R2 is also reported in Table 3.
Relationship of the Model to Experimental Hypotheses
All else equal, when H4 holds, H1, H2, and H3 will also hold. However, H1 (the effect
on response frequencies) could fail when H4 holds because both vnT and vnC are very small and
a ceiling effect occurs for positive responses (or alternatively they are large and a floor effect
occurs). H2 (the effect on reaction times) could fail when H4 holds because vnC is much larger
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than vnT (which would be consistent with H5). This result is counter-intuitive because it seems
that vnT and vnC should not affect reaction times for positive responses. However, because the
reaction times are conditional upon the response, there are indirect “competitive” effects. If vnC
is very large then this strong competition means that a positive response for control ads will
occur only for the fastest times in the distribution of possible times for positive evidence
reaching Kp. That is, the conditional mean reaction time is based on a highly truncated
distribution. If vnT is very small, then positive responses will be frequent, truncation will be
minimal, and the reaction time will increase. In principle, these factors could overcome the
effect of vpT being larger than vpC. For example, H2 fails when vnT = 1 < 4 = vnC, even though
vpT = 2 > 1 = vpC. Finally, H3 (the effect on confidence ratings) could fail when H4 holds
because of competitive effects opposite to those just described.

For example, H2 fails when

vnT = 1 > .25 = vnC, even though vpT = 2 > 1 = vpC. Of course, this competitive effect
contradicts H5.
Some Properties of the Poisson Counting Model
Expected values for response probabilities, RT, and confidence are as follows (for
simplicity g and h are assumed to be the identity function).
c+

Σ(

)( ) ( )

Kp + j - 1
j
j = c-

P(R = p) = Pp =

vn

Σ(

vp

vp + vn

Kn - 1
Kp + j - 1
E(T | R = p) =
j
Pp j = 0
1

j

Kp

.

vp + vn

(A.5)

)( ) ( ) ( )
vn

vp + vn

j

vp

vp + vn

Kp

Kp + j
vp + vn

.

(A.6)
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Kn - 1
Kp + j - 1
E(C | R = p) =
j
Pp j = 0
1

Σ(

)( ) ( )
vn

j

vp

vp + vn

Kp
(Kp – j) .

vp + vn

(A.7)

To see the relationship between RT and confidence, note that for positive responses the
expect value of the negative counter when the positive response occurs is as follows.
Kn - 1
Kp + j - 1
E(Xn | R = p) =
j
Pp j = 0
1

Σ(

)( ) ( )
vn

vp + vn

j

vp

vp + vn

Kp
j .

(A.8)

As a result, the expected values of RT and confidence can be written as follows.
E(T | R = p) = [Kp + E(Xn | R = p)] / (vp + vn)
E(C | R = p) = Kp - E(Xn | R = p)

(A.9)
(A.10)

From A.9 and A.10 it is clear that the Poisson counting model predicts a negative linear
relationship between RT and confidence whenever vp + vn is constant (or relatively low in
variance across observations). Note that vp + vn is the rate parameter for the overall process.
Inspection of A.6 and A.8 reveals that they can be rewritten in terms of θp and θn, where θp =
vp/(vp + vn) and θn = vn/(vp + vn). Thus, response frequencies and confidence ratings depend on
the relative rates at which positive and negative evidence accumulates. RT is also affected by the
absolute overall rate. This is provides another way of understanding how RT might be lower for
control ads even though vpT > vpC , as hypothesized. That is, θpT > θpC, but vpT + vnT < vpC
+ vnC (i.e., evidence accumulation is slower for target ads than for control ads).
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APPENDIX B: EXPERIMENT MATERIALS IN EXPERIMENT 4
BELIEF VALENCE
POSITIVE
SUV

TV

CHIPNUTS

LOTION

NEGATIVE

The Fiat Punto SUV has high quality.

The Fiat Punto SUV has low quality.

The Fiat Punto SUV is a car I like.

The Fiat Punto SUV is a car not for me.

The Fiat Punto SUV has a great price.

The Fiat Punto SUV has a price that's too high.

The Fiat Punto SUV is cool.

The Fiat Punto SUV is boring.

The Fiat Punto SUV is fast.

The Fiat Punto SUV is slow.

The Fiat Punto SUV has good gas mileage.

The Fiat Punto SUV has bad gas mileage.

The Panasonic Plasma has high quality.

The Panasonic Plasma has low quality.

The Panasonic Plasma is a TV I like.

The Panasonic Plasma is a TV not for me.

The Panasonic Plasma has a great price.

The Panasonic Plasma has a price that's too high.

The Panasonic Plasma is cool.

The Panasonic Plasma is boring.

The Panasonic Plasma is beautiful.

The Panasonic Plasma is ugly.

The Panasonic Plasma has a clear picture.

The Panasonic Plasma has a fuzzy picture.

The Fired-Up Chipnut has high quality.

The Fired-Up Chipnut has low quality.

The Fired-Up Chipnut is a source I like.

The Fired-Up Chipnut is a source not for me.

The Fired-Up Chipnut has a great price.

The Fired-Up Chipnut has a price that's too high.

The Fired-Up Chipnut is cool.

The Fired-Up Chipnut is boring.

The Fired-Up Chipnut is spicy.

The Fired-Up Chipnut is too spicy.

The Fired-Up Chipnut has a delicious taste.

The Fired-Up Chipnut has an awful taste.

The Nivea Body Shimmer Lotion has high quality.

The Nivea Body Shimmer Lotion has low quality.

The Nivea Body Shimmer Lotion is a lotion I like.

The Nivea Body Shimmer Lotion is a lotion not for me.

The Nivea Body Shimmer Lotion has a great price.
The Nivea Body Shimmer Lotion is cool.

The Nivea Body Shimmer Lotion has a price that's too
high.
The Nivea Body Shimmer Lotion is boring.

The Nivea Body Silky Shimmer Lotion is effective.

The Nivea Body Silky Shimmer Lotion is ineffective.

The Nivea Body Silky Shimmer Lotion has a
pleasing fragrance.

The Nivea Body Silky Shimmer Lotion has a nasty
smell.
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Exhibit 1
EXPERIMENTAL HYPOTHESES
H1:

More positive responses will be observed in thought recognition and belief verification
tasks for high thought likelihood (target) advertisements than for low thought likelihood
(control) advertisements.

H2:

Reaction times for positive responses to thought recognition and belief verification tasks
will be lower for high thought likelihood (target) advertisements than for low thought
likelihood (control) advertisements.

H3:

Confidence ratings for positive responses to thought recognition and belief verification
tasks will be higher for high thought likelihood (target) advertisements than for low
thought likelihood (control) advertisements.

H4:

When the parameters of the counting model of responses, reactions times, and confidence
ratings are estimated, vpT will be greater than vpC .

H5:

When the parameters of the counting model of responses, reactions times, and confidence
ratings are estimated, vpT - vpC will be greater than vnT - vnC.

H6:

The valence of a specific cognitive response has a positive effect on attitude, assuming
that the thought recognition or belief verification response was positive.

H7:

Reaction times for positive responses to thought recognition and belief verification tasks
have (a) a positive effect on attitude (b) that is moderated by valence such that the effect
is positive only when valence is positive.

H8:

Confidence ratings for positive responses to thought recognition and belief verification
tasks have (a) a positive effect on attitude (b) that is moderated by valence such that the
effect is positive only when valence is positive.

H9:

The effects of valence, reaction time, and confidence on attitude (i.e., H6, H7, and H8)
are reversed when the associated thought recognition or belief verification response is
negative.
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Table 1
SUMMARY OF MEASURES RELATED TO COGNITIVE RESPONSE
Task

Sample Stimulus

Thought Listing We are now interested in everything that went through your
mind when viewing the magazine ads earlier in this
experiment. Please list these thoughts, whether they were
about yourself, the ads, or the products; whether they were
positive, neutral and/or negative.

Thought
Recognition

Belief
Verification

When viewing advertisements, people often have a variety
of thoughts and reactions. Regardless of what you believe
now, when viewing the magazine ads earlier in this
experiment, do you ever think to yourself, ‘The Fiat SUV is
fast’? *

The Fiat SUV is fast. *

Measure

Type

References

Response
(open-ended)

Explicit

Valence (& other
coding schemes)

Explicit or
Implicit

Cacioppo & Petty (1981); Cacioppo et al. (1997);
Ericcson & Simon (1980); Toy 1982; Wansink, Ray, &
Batra (1994)
Chattopadhyay & Alba (1988); Cacioppo & Petty (1981)

Response Time

Implicit

None found.

Confidence

Explicit

Brinol, Petty, & Tormala (2004); Petty, Brinol, &
Tormala (2002)

Response
(Yes/No)

Explicit

Cacioppo et al. (1997)

Valence (& other
coding schemes)

Explicit or
Implicit

Cacioppo et al. (1997)

Response Time

Implicit

Van Zandt & Maldonado-Molina (2004)

Confidence

Explicit

Krishnan & Smith (1998); Van Zandt (2000)

Response
(Agree/Disagree)

Implicit

Fishbein & Ajzen 1975; Lutz 1975

Valence (& other
coding schemes)

Explicit or
Implicit

Bodur, Brinberg, & Coupey (2000); Marks & Kamins
(1988)

Response Time

Implicit

Smith, Shoben, & Rips (1974); Rosch et al. (1976)

Confidence

Implicit

Bodur, Brinberg, & Coupey (2000); Krishnan & Smith
(1998); Marks & Kamins (1988)

* The underlined word was shown after a delay. Response times were measured from the onset of that terminal word.
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Table 2
LEAST-SQUARE MEAN RESPONSE TIMES AND CONFIDENCE RATINGS FOR
EXPERIMENTS 1 - 3

Thought
Likelihood

Response Type

Frequency
Percent
Chosen
Chosen
Experiment 1 - Thought Recognition

Response
Time (msec)

Confidence
Rating

Low

Positive (Yes)

135

45

2789

1.80

High

Positive (Yes)

211

73

2391

2.12

-28

398

-.32

55

2871

1.95

Difference
Low

Negative (No)

164

High

Negative (No)

80

27

2971

1.90

28

-100

.05

Experiment 2 - Belief Verification
223
75

2450

1.60

Difference

Low

Positive (Agree)

High

Positive (Agree)

263

Difference

99

1955

2.05

-13

495

-.45

Low

Negative (Disagree)

73

25

2701

1.00

High

Negative (Disagree)

35

12

2269

1.21

13

432

-.21

48

2764

1.78

Difference

Experiment 3 - Thought Recognition
Low

Positive (Yes)

75

High

Positive (Yes)

115

Difference

70

2404

2.10

-22

360

-.32

Low

Negative (No)

82

52

2690

2.10

High

Negative (No)

50

30

3360

1.80

22

-670

.30

Experiment 3 - Belief Verification
88
45

Difference

Low

Positive (Agree)

High

Positive (Agree)

102

Difference

2968

1.45

65

2270

2.00

-20

698

-.55

Low

Negative (Disagree)

25

55

4095

-.61

High

Negative (Disagree)

16

35

2958

1.01

20

1137

1.65

Difference
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Table 3
ESTIMATED PARAMETERS FOR A POISSON COUNTING MODEL
OF RESPONSE PROBABILITIES, REACTION TIMES, AND CONFIDENCE RATINGS

Stimuli

N

Kp Kn T0

vpT

vnT vpT + vnT

vpC

vnC vpT + vnT

VAF*

D1

t1

D2

t2

Experiment 1 - Thought Recognition
Lotion

147

4

4

-.2

.9

.8

1.7

.6

1.2

1.8

.06 / .37

.3

5.4

-.3

-5.2

Chipnuts 149

4

6

-.2

1.5

.9

2.4

1.3

1.3

2.6

.14 / .66

.2

2.0

-.4

-5.1

SUV

147

5

6

-.1

1.3

1.2

2.5

.7

1.9

2.5

.14 / .63

.6

8.4

-.6

-7.3

TV

147

5

6

-.3

2.0

.5

2.5

1.6

.8

2.5

.21 / .65

.3

3.4

-.3

-4.8

Experiment 2 - Belief Verification
Lotion

149

4

4

.5

1.4

.7

2.1

1.3

1.0

2.3

.16 / .77

.2

2.0

-.3

-4.7

Chipnuts 148

4

4

-.4

2.1

.6

2.8

1.9

.9

2.8

.03 / .32

.3

2.1

-.3

-3.5

SUV

148

5

5

-.6

1.7

.9

2.6

1.1

1.1

2.2

.16 / .76

.6

6.9

-.2

-3.6

TV

149

5

5

-.1

3.1

.7

3.8

2.4

.7

3.1

.25 / .97

.7

4.5

-.0

-.4

Experiment 3 - Thought Recognition
Lotion

80

6

6

-.6

1.0

1.1

2.0

.7

1.4

2.1

.20 / .65

.3

3.5

-.3

-3.3

Chipnuts 81

5

6

-.5

1.8

.8

2.6

1.3

1.3

2.6

.21 / .80

.5

4.0

-.5

-4.7

SUV

81

5

6

-.2

1.4

1.3

2.7

.7

1.9

2.6

.05 / .22

.7

7.0

-.6

-4.8

TV

80

5

6

-.6

1.5

.4

1.9

1.4

.7

2.1

.16 / .58

.1

.6

-.3

-4.6

Experiment 3 - Belief Verification
Lotion

56

5

6

.6

2.0

1.1

3.1

1.2

1.1

2.2

.34 / .90

.8

4.7

.1

.4

Chipnuts 60

6

6

.0

3.3

.8

4.1

2.5

1.1

3.6

.25 / .73

.8

3.5

-.3

-2.2

SUV

56

5

6

-.0

1.4

1.2

2.6

1.1

1.2

2.4

.15 / .74

.3

2.2

-.0

-.3

TV

59

5

6

-.1

2.5

.4

2.9

2.2

.8

3.0

.28 / .78

.3

1.3

-.4

-3.5

K(.) - Decision threshold; T0 - Response time intercept in seconds; V(.) - Rate parameters
p - Positive Response ( “Yes” or “Agree”); n - Negative Response (“No” or “Disagree”); T - Target Ad ; C - Control Ad
VAF* - Variance Accounted For: Overall/Systematic (see Appendix A for definitions)
D1 - vpT - vpC, predicted to be greater than 0 (H4)
R2 - vnT - vnC, predicted to be less than D1 (H5)
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Table 4
REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR ATTITUDES IN THE BELIEF VERIFICATION
TASK IN EXPERIMENT 3

Response

Valence

Positive
Negative

.21a
.13f

Reaction
Time
(Positive
Valence)
-.08b
.15f

Reaction
Time
(Negative
Valence)
.04c
.54f

Confidence
(Positive
Valence)
.22d
-.59f

a H6 predicts this coefficient to be positive.
b H7a predicts this coefficient to be negative.
c H7b predicts this coefficient to be positive.
d H8a predicts this coefficient to be positive.
e H8b predicts this coefficient to be negative.
f H9 predicts these coefficients to be reversed in sign compared to the coefficient above them.

Confidence
(Negative
Valence)
.50e
-.68f
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Table 5
REGRESSION MODEL RESULTS FOR EXPERIMENT 4
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

β

β

β

β

F

β

F

β

F

---

---

---

-1.25

46.6

-.82

21.1

SUV - Target

.20

1.2

.38

4.9

TV - Target

.85

19.9

.29

2.7

Lotion - Control

.32

2.5

.07

.2

-1.25

47.9

-.83

21.8

SUV - Control

-.65

12.0

-.17

.9

TV - Control

1.00

29.4

.22

1.5

---

---

---

---

-.86

44.9

-.71

30.1

F

F

F

Ad Dummy Variables
Lotion - Target
Chipnuts - Target

Chipnuts - Control

---

Product Dummy Variables
Lotion

---

Chipnuts

---

-1.41 124.8

SUV
TV

-.35

7.5

.08

.4

.09

.5

.76

34.2

.22

3.0

.30

5.5

Belief Verification Indices
Valence

.35 330.0

RT (Agree)

.27 173.4

.27 170.0

-.12

4.5

-.10

3.2

-.11

4.3

RT (Disagree)

.02

.2

.04

.7

.04

.6

Confidence (Agree)

.16

5.6

.30

21.9

.31

22.1

-.14

3.5

-.04

.4

-.05

.6

Confidence (Disagree)

.31 241.0

Fit Measures
-2LL

2218

2246

1706

1610

1622

1667

AIC

2238

2258

1722

1640

1644

1681

BIC

2274

2279

1749

1691

1682

1705

* Dummy variables are 0/1. The Valence Index is the number of positive agree responses minus the number of negative agree
responses. The RT index is the average positive RT minus the average negative RT (in seconds). The Confidence Index is the
average positive confidence rating minus the average negative confidence rating (ratings were a 3-point scale). See text for
computational details.
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FIGURE 1
ADVERTISEMENTS USED IN ALL EXPERIMENTS
Target Attributes

Fast

Spicy

Expensive

Cheap

Target Ads
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FIGURE 2
An Example of the Poisson Counting Model of Decisions, Response Times, and Confidence

Positive evidence counter, rate = vp = 2, criterion = Kp = 5:

Negative evidence counter, rate = vn = 1, criterion = Kn = 6:

Superimposed evidence counting process, rate = vp + vn = 3:

Positive response chosen at t = 2.7,
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FIGURE 3
Belief Verification Indices Plotted against Attitude
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